PROGRAM: Ladies of the Press

INTERVIEW WITH MR. DULLES

Moderator: Clifford Evans.

Guest: Allen W. Dulles, former Director of Central

Intelligence Agency.

Panel: Gay Pauley, UPI

Georgiana O'Kane of World Telegram & Sun

Joan Cook, New York Times.

THE PARTICIPANTS WERE SEEN ON THE TELEVISION SCREEN, SEATED IN THE STUDIO.

EVANS: "Our guest is Allen W. Dulles, honored by President Kennedy, with the National Security Medal in 1961, decorated by the governments of France, Belgium, and Italy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for nine years. Allen W. Dulles, welcome to 'Ladies of the Press.' And now our first question from Gay Pauley, of United Press International, whose column appears in the Philadelphia Bulletin, and in 300 other newspapers throughout the country."

PAULEY: "Mr. Dulles, does Fidel Castro have a future?"

DULLES: "I hope not."

PAULEY: "What is your judgment of what is to become of the man?"

DULLES: "Well, I rather think he may fade away."

PAULEY: "How soon, when?"

DULLES: "Well, that I can't tell. As soon as the economy of Cuba has reached the point of no return. How long that will take, I don't know. And that of course is leaving aside what other extraneous things may come in. But let's assume the situation continues as it is today—it will be I think, when the economy falls

to pieces."

PAULEY: "What extraneous things, sir?"

DULLES: "The intervention of some other power."

PAULEY: "You mean Russia?"

DULLES: "No, not Russia. Russia has already intervened."

PAULEY: "Well then what other power, possibly?"

DULLES: "Any of the American powers, including the United States."

PAULEY: "Mr. Kennedy keeps talking about a free Cuba. If Castro is to go, who is to succeed him?"

DULLES: "That one rarely knows, in a situation of this kind. There are leaders--underground leaders in Cuba. We have a great many devoted, able Cubans in this country--in Florida and all over the country."

PAULEY: "Yes, but we don't hear of any particular one, like we did when Castro was rising to power and Batista was being over-thrown."

DULLES: "Well that often happens in situations of this kind. Once the communists have taken over in a country, you don't hear of people any more that are opposed to the communist leaders, that is insofar as the country itself is concerned. And I would think that the future leadership of Cuba would very likely come from inside of Cuba--it might of course come from the exiles."

PAULEY: "Do you think in the form of possibly an overthrow, as it happened when Castro overthrew Batista?"

DULLES: "Like a watch that might run down. Whether there'll be a dramatic overthrow, that's hard to tell."

EVANS: "Georgiana O'Kane of the New York World Telegram & Sun."

O'KANE: "Mr. Dulles, the Cuban exiles have claimed that they

were promised support when they invaded Cuba in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Were they promised such support?"

DULLES: "Not so far as I know--not so far as I know. No one in authority, as far as I know, had promised them support, as far as the American government is concerned."

O'KANE: "It has been reported that you had expected that when they arrived, there would be uprisings within Cuba, to meet the invasion. Did you expect uprisings?"

DULLES: "Mrs. O'Kane, during the war, I was working-that is during the last war I was working in Switzerland, and there I was in touch with the underground, and I knew that the last thing that one wanted was an uprising against overwhelming superior forces. And therefore, as far as I know, there was no attempt made to have a spontaneous, unarmed uprising at the time of the Bay of Pigs."

O'KANE: "Did you expect that there would be spontaneous help given to the invaders?"

DULLES: "I think it was generally considered in the United States that if the brigade was successful in making a landing, that there would be a considerable accretion to the already existing underground that there was in Cuba."

O'KANE: "We've heard so much about dissatisfaction in Cuba that it seems -- if it's true that they are dissatisfied -- that it would have been a perfect moment for uprisings, demonstrations -- "

DULLES: "There is always dissatisfaction in all of the countries that have been taken over by communists--dissatisfaction in Hungary, dissatisfaction in Poland; so was there dissatisfaction in Cuba. They're a police state--it's very hard to register that."

EVANS: "Joan Cook, New York Times."

COOK: "Mr. Dulles, as Director of the CIA, you have been accused of being responsible for the blunder of the Cuban invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Do you accept this responsibility?"

DULLES: "In intelligence, Mrs. Cook, one does not discuss one's operations. What I have been saying here is what I have from general knowledge. And I never discuss—never have discussed any phase of the brigade's invasion of the Bay of Pigs. By the way, I

understand that really should be the Bay of Pigs (?)--really that word in Spanish, as I understand it, means a small fish that looks like a pig, but it's got the name the Bay of Pigs--I believe that's a small fish, but I've never verified it..."

COOK: "Mr. Dulles, the CIA was also accused of being strongly influenced by information provided by exiles, who were out of touch with their country, in the case of Cuban exiles in Florida. Do you care to comment on that?"

DULLES: "Well I would say that in general, and I've had quite a long experience with exiles since World War I, I never have relied on the word of exiles alone."

COOK: "Do you measure up the information from exiles as against information from within a given country?"

DULLES: "Oh certainly--certainly one always would do that, because the exile always has such deep feelings and deep prejudices, that while I respect them, I want some confirmation of their judgment."

COOK: "Mr. Dulles, may I ask, when the CIA recommends support to a given government, is this done on the basis of the fact that the government is anti-communist, or that it is supported by the people of a given country. On what basis is such a recommendation made?"

DULLES: "I don't think I quite understand your question. How would that arise? I wish you could be a little more precise as to what the question is. We don't go around giving advice to governments—that isn't the job of the CIA. At least it wasn't in my day; I'm speaking as an individual of course—I haven't been in charge of it for over a year."

COOK: "Then in, for example, let's say in support of the government of Laos, or the support of the Chinese government on Taiwan, or any government that the United States decides to give its support to, the incumbent leadership, or a particular segment of leadership, on what basis is—"

Of State. They are the ones to decide to whom support should be given, and from whom support should be withheld, not the CIA."

EVANS: "Mr. Dulles, would you clarify a word...in answer to a question before--what support did we promise the exiles in their attempted return to Cuba? They say that we promised air support, in addition to material support. Is your answer negative on both scores?"

DULLES: "As far as I know, it's negative, yes."

EVANS: "Gay, Pauley, United Press International."

PAULEY: "Well a lot of Cubans say that we did promise air support. A lot of Cuban exiles, certainly--a lot of them denounced the CIA at the time."

DULLES: "I don't know about that -- I'm just answering what I know."

PAULEY: "Why didn't you advise Mr. Kennedy to stop the invasion, Mr. Dulles?" Or at least slow it down--delay it?"

DULLES: "These matters are policy matters. And in the CIA we have always tried to follow a policy, and not make policy."

PAULEY: "Aren't you supposed to advise though, on the basis of the knowledge you have, as head of an intelligence agency?"

 $\stackrel{\mbox{\scriptsize DULLES:}}{\mbox{\scriptsize Tauley."}}$ "If they ask on matters within our competence, Mrs.

PAULEY: "Well if you had it to do over again, as head of CIA, would you go ahead with the Cuban invasion?"

DULLES: "In our field, we don't speculate on things like that."

PAULEY: "Oh you don't speculate on things like that? Well, let's go to Mr. Khrushchev. He has said that he will never leave Cuba in a lurch. Do you think that Cuba could still trigger World War III despite Mr. Kennedy's very strong stand, and which Mr. Khrushchev backed out?"

DULLES: "I doubt whether Cuba could. I believe Cuba could make a certain number of difficulties, but I doubt now whether Cuba could trigger a world crisis."

EVANS: "Georgiana O'Kane, New York World Telegram & Sun."

O'KANE: "Mr. Dulles, the U-2 flight, in which Francis Gary Powers was brought down, caused a lot of grief to this country. Do you feel that the flights themselves were of enough value to overcome that one incident?"

DULLES: "I would say the flights were of great value. I don't think it's up to me to judge. Our job is to get intelligence within the limits allowed and permitted, and advised by the policy makers. They have to judge—the policy makers have to judge the risks, and the relative value or demerits—the balance sheet, the cost, which sometimes is high; but the intelligence may be vital to our security."

O'KANE: "I have another question on Mr. Powers. But first I just want to say that this is not the impression that had been given for a long time about the CIA, when you were the Director. The charges were made on all sides that it was a policy-making organization, that it made too much policy, that it was too strong, and that it wasn't simply an adviser."

DULLES: "You've been reading some books, I think, that have been published recently. Those were written by people that had about as much knowledge of the CIA as I have of the atomic bomb."

O'KANE: "I also would like to ask you if you believe that Mr. Powers should have taken a pill to end his life, as some critics of his actions have said, instead of letting himself be captured."

DULLES: "He was under no instructions to take the pill. The pill was given to him, in the event he was in a situation where he thought death was the best way out."

EVANS: "Joan Cook, New York Times."

COOK: "Mr. Dulles, in regard to the Soviet Union's military future, you have said that they have conditioned their people to accept very real sacrifices and low standard of living to permit the military buildup to continue. How would they accomplish this, in your opinion?"

DULIES: "Well I don't recall where I said that exact statement. A low standard of living, or a lower standard of living than they otherwise would have, has been forced upon them by the diversion of so large a part of the assets of the Soviet Union to heavy industry and military equipment. Now they had no choice. They can't say we want a higher standard of living-give it to us, and have less missiles. That choice is made by others, so that-"

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COOK: "But, sir, in a speech before the Edison Electric Institute in New Orleans on April 8th, in 1959, you used the phrase 'they have conditioned their people to accept very real sacrifices.' I wondered what you meant by this, that they have been forced to accept—"

DULLES: "They are under very stern discipline, and if one looks back on the 30 years that Stalin was really in control, and what he forced the people to accept during that period--there has been some relaxation since--but they were conditioned over a long period, to take what they got from the government and to like it. They had no choice."

COOK: "Do you feel that there is any real rebellion or dissatisfaction from within the Soviet Union on any large scale?"

DULLES: "As I said there has been a certain amount of relaxation under Khrushchev, not as far as general liberalization is concerned, but the concentration camps have been pretty largely dene away with, and there is somewhat more freedom--not much freedom--than there used to be."

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EVANS: "Mr. Dulles, during World War II, your base was in Switzerland. Now the Potsdam Conference-Stalin and President Truman. At that conference you came there with information from Japan indicating the possibility of a Japanese surrender. Do you think, in view of that, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary?"

DULLES: "That's a pretty tough question to answer, Mr. Evans. I did not have the facts to pass on that. I went to Potsdam; I was then in touch with certain Japanese in Switzerland, who in turn were in touch with high quarters, and I assumed, the Emperor, and they came to me and said that Japan was ready to surrender, provided the Mikado, the Emperor could be saved, so as to have some unity in Japan. I took that word to Secretary Stimson at Potsdam on the 20th of July, 1945. But I had been cooped up in Switzerland most of the time, and I don't think I had any right to any judgment. Wiser men than I, people that knew the military situation, reached the decision. I have great admiration for Secretary Stimson and President Truman, and of course their judgment was controlling."

EVANS: "From a moral point of view, do you have any feeling on the use of the bomb at that time?"

DULLES: "No, I don't think I have any feeling of that kind.

The history of the world is that you use the best weapon that you have in case you go to war, and I think we've got to assume that is the situation today, and was the situation in 1945."

GAY PAULEY: "You've been advising our government for some 20 years in intelligence work, counting your years in Switzerland, sir. What is your educated guess on what Mr. Khrushchev's plans are for Berlin?"

DULLES: "(LAUGHTER) I don't believe in 20 years-twenty-five, as a matter of fact-even 25 years is enough to give me the hardihood to say what Mr. Khrushchev will do. I think that for one thing, that since Cuba, we've got to expect Mr. Khrushchev to do the unexpected-he often does--"

PAULEY: "And he always has--"

DULLES: "And therefore, not the thing he's going to do, necessarily in Berlin or anywhere else, is exactly what you expect. What the unexpected is in this case, I just can't tell you."

PAULEY: "You don't want to speculate at all? Does time work for the Reds in Berlin?"

DULLES: "No, I don't think so. I don't think particularly so. I think that the Wall, which looked like a defeat for the West is more and more becoming a defeat for the communists. And therefore I don't want to say that time is working for the Reds."

EVANS: "Georgiana O'Kane, New York World Telegram."

O'KANE: "Mr. Dulles, in 1953 and '54, the CIA was organizing commando raids by the nationalist Chinese against the China coast. Recently Chiang Kai-shek has been announcing similar raids, by commandos, and I'm curious as to just what point there is in this kind of small raiding, against the communists--"

DULLES: "You started off, Mrs. O'Kane, with a statement, and I don't wish to by not denying the statement, to admit its truth. Commando raids, looking at the thing from the technical point of view, are engaged in in order to test out an enemy as to where his forces are, what his reaction is likely to be, and I assume that if Chiang Kai-shek is engaging in such operations, it's in order to

get a sample of what the situation is on the mainland opposite him. At the time you speak of, may I point out, that the United States was at that time at war in Korea, and that we were fighting the Chinese Communists in Korea, at the time you speak of."

O'KANE: "In this case, it strikes me that the Red Chinese reaction to this kind of commando raids might very well be an invasion of Formosa, and Matsu and Quemoy. Would you consider that these raids might lead to invasion, and then to a bigger war?"

DULLES: "I don't think you need an invasion until you've got something to invade in; I mean I don't think they have the ships of the naval force to invade Taiwan. They might stand off at a distance and hurl rockets at it, but I don't think they can do much more than that."

EVANS: "Joan Cook, New York Times."

COOK: "Mr. Dulles, both James Reston of the New York Times and Walter Lippmann of the New York Herald Tribune, have asserted that the world balance of power has shifted from the United States preponderence to an East-West equality, and that our foreign policy must be adjusted to this reality. How do you feel about this?"

DULLES: "Well I'm not sure you're absolutely correct, but you ought to know, being on the New York Times. The general feeling that I have, and as I say, I've been out for over a year now, is the general feeling that our military situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is better today than we had assumed a year ago that it would be. The fact that Khrushchev went to all these pains to put his missiles in Cuba has been interpreted in many fields as indicating that he wasn't as strong as one had thought some years ago he might be by this time."

CCOK: "Sir, you said, you cited the fact that Soviet industry has grown at a greater annual rate, this was in 1959, than the United States' industrial growth, and that in a short span of 33 years the Soviet Union has grown from a relatively backward country to the second largest industrialized economy in the world. Yet at the same time you said you did not attribute this to Soviet efficiency. To what do you attribute this phenomenal leap forward?"

DULLES: "When did I say it wasn't attributal to Soviet efficiency--I don't recall that."

COOK: "The Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1959."

DULLES: "Well, the Soviet economy has grown very rapidly.

It's partly because they started from a very low base. Our economy has grown somewhat more slowly, but it's because we had achieved, over the preceding years a very high base, and when you get to a high base, then your progress is slower. I believe that we'll find that the rate of growth in the Soviet Union will be tapering off to some extent."

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PAULEY: "Mr. Dulles, when do you think that Mr. Chaing Kai-shek will head his nationalist government back to the Red China mainland?"

DULLES: "Mr. Chaing Kai-shek is getting on, --"

PAULEY: "Do you think there's a chance he won't -- "

DULLES: "I think there has to be a breakdown--some breakdown in the economy of Communist China..."

PAULEY: "It must have been very difficult to get any information of value out of Red China. I wonder if you would think that recognizing Communist China would open a pipeline of information, so that we could get a better look at the country?"

DULLES: "I doubt whether there'd be much of a pipeline. I've been in touch with the representatives of the countries which have diplomatic relations with Communist China, and they've got very, very little."

EVANS: "Joan Cook, New York Times."

COOK: "In April of 1960, James Reston of the New York Times said that the State Department is worried about the political and military consequences in this hemisphere and elsewhere of providing military force to achieve political ends. Would you care to comment on this?"

DULLES: "Military force?"

COOK: "For political ends."

DULLES: "I don't believe that one should initiate a war for political ends, and I don't quite know what he was--"

COOK: "He was referring to Cuba, and the danger of a projected


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invasion, what the reaction of the world, and Latin America particularly would be towards use of military force."

DULLES: "Well, generally in this world, if one is successful one is at fault. If one fails, then you have the opposite treatment. That applies, I think, to international field, as well as in the personal field."

EVANS: "Well on that note, we bring our program to a close, today's session of Ladies of the Press, an actual press conference, completely ad lib and unrehearsed. Our guest today has been Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency..."





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